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THE TYRANNY OF THE MULTITUDE IS A 
MULTIPLIED TYRANNY:1 
IS THE UNITED STATES FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY STRUCTURE UNDERMINING 
U.S. COMPETITIVENESS? 
Elizabeth F. Brown2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a 2006 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, New York City Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg and New York Senator Charles Schumer sounded the 
alarm that the United States was losing its competitive edge in the area of 
financial services.3 A number of studies and academic articles completed in 
the wake of this op-ed compared the market share and growth of the United 
States in certain segments of financial services, particularly securities and 
investment banking, with that of other nations.4 Some of these studies 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Edmund Burke, Letter, Feb. 26, 1790. 
 2. Assistant Professor, The University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota), BA, 1985, 
The College of William and Mary, MA, 1987, The Nitze School of Advanced International 
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and JD, 1994, The University of Chicago Law School. 
Research stipends from the University of St. Thomas School of Law were of assistance in the 
preparation of this article. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Roberta 
Karmel, Lisa Schiltz, Susan Stabile, the participants at the Seventh Annual Global Conference on 
Business and Economics, at which a draft of this article was presented on Oct. 14, 2007, and the 
participants at American Association of Law School’s Section on Securities Regulation meeting, 
at which a draft of this article was presented on Jan. 4, 2008, and the research assistance of Martin 
Norder. 
 3. Charles E. Schumer & Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York, Learn from London, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2006, at A18. In this article, “financial services” refers to any of the 
activities considered financial in nature pursuant to Section 103 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
of 1999 (GLBA), which include banking, securities, merchant banking, and insurance products 
and services. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k) (2007). This definition of 
financial services is not universally applied by other organizations. For example, the Basel II 
Capital Accord excludes insurance activities from the definition of “financial activities” and 
excludes insurance entities from the definition of “financial entities.” BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK 7 n.5 (2004) [hereinafter 
BASEL II CAPITAL ACCORD]. 
 4. MCKINSEY & CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
SERVICES LEADERSHIP (2007), available at http://www.senate.gov/~schumer/SchumerWebsite/ 
pressroom/special_reports/2007/NY_REPORT%20_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter MCKINSEY 
REPORT]; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT (2006) [hereinafter COMM. 
ON CAPITAL MKTS., INTERIM REPORT]; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE 
COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET (2007) [hereinafter COMM. ON 
CAPITAL MKTS., COMPETITIVE POSITION REPORT]; COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. 
CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2007) [hereinafter U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COMM’N REPORT]; 
RICHARD M. KOVACEVICH ET AL., FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE, THE BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. 
FINANCIAL COMPETITIVENESS (2007) [hereinafter FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE REPORT]; Chris 
Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Market for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
370 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
concluded that the previous lead of the United States was eroding and that 
the trends indicated that it would continue to erode unless something was 
done.5 These recommended a wide range of reforms to the current system.6 
Among the recommended reforms was a call to consolidate financial 
services regulators in the United States, perhaps going as far as creating a 
single financial services regulator like the United Kingdom’s Financial 
Services Authority (UK FSA).7 
Not surprisingly, the conclusions of these studies generated a 
significant amount of concern in the U.S. financial press and among U.S. 
policymakers. The concern that the way in which the United States 
regulates financial services might be undermining U.S. competitiveness 
even played an influential role in the recently decided Stoneridge 
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.8 In that case, Justice 
Kennedy rejected the petitioners’ “scheme liability” concept of reliance.9 
The Court was concerned that accepting the plaintiff’s theory would 
undermine Congress’ specific intent to not provide for a private cause of  
action against aiders and abettors.10 He worried that such an expansion 
would have negative practical consequences because: 
Overseas firms with no other exposure to our securities laws could be 
deterred from doing business here. This, in turn, may raise the cost of 
                                                                                                                 
(forthcoming 2008); Stephen J. Choi, Channeling Competition in the Global Securities Market 
(Univ. Cal. Berkeley Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 
111, 2003), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=371700; John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing 
Towards the Top? The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International 
Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (2002); James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S. 
Securities Laws in the Shadow of International Regulatory Competition, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 157 (1992); Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. REV. 
89 (2007); Peter Hostak et al., An Examination of the Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the 
Attractiveness of U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign Firms (Apr. 30, 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=956020); Donald C. Langevoort, The Social 
Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817 (2007); Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley 
and the Cross-Listing Premium, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1858 (2007); Eric J. Pan, Why the World No 
Longer Puts its Stock in Us (Cardozo Sch. of Law Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal Studies, 
Working Paper No. 176, 2006), available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract=951705; Larry E. Ribstein, 
Cross-Listing and Regulatory Competition, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 97 (2005). 
 5. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 7–29; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., INTERIM REPORT, 
supra note 4, at 1–22; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., COMPETITIVE POSITION REPORT, supra note 4, 
at 1; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COMM’N REPORT, supra note 4, at 146; FIN. SERVS. 
ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7–15. 
 6. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 95–127; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., INTERIM 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 1–22; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COMM’N REPORT, supra note 4, at 
164–76; FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 11–15. 
 7. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 24–25; see U.K. FSA, What We Do, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/What/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
 8. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 772 (2008). 
 9. Id. at 770. Under the scheme liability concept of reliance, “in an efficient market investors 
rely not only upon the public statements relating to a security but also upon the transactions those 
statements reflect.” Id. 
 10. Id. 771. 
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being a publicly traded company under our law and shift securities 
offerings away from domestic capital markets.11 
The claim that the U.S. regulatory structure undermines U.S. 
competitiveness appears at first blush to have some validity. Presumably if 
a system or process aids competitiveness, others will copy it. The failure to 
copy a particular process or system suggests that it is perhaps not 
instrumental in enhancing the competitiveness of an entity, a market, or a 
nation. While other nations have adopted laws and regulations similar to 
U.S. financial regulations,12 no other nation has sought to copy the federal 
and state regulatory structure that the United States uses to supervise and 
regulate financial services. Currently, the United States has over 115 federal 
and state agencies involved in regulating some aspect of financial services 
and Congress is contemplating adding new agencies to the list.13 
In fact, the rest of the world is moving in the other direction. As 
illustrated in Table 1, fifty nations have consolidated their financial services 
regulators, and sixteen nations, including the United Kingdom, Germany 
and Japan, have created single financial services agencies. 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Id. at 772 (citation omitted). Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion directly challenged 
this view. He quoted with approval from the Brief for Former SEC Commissioners as Amici 
Curiae that making those who violate § 10(b) liable for these violations “‘will not harm American 
competitiveness; in fact, investor faith in the safety and integrity of our markets is their strength. 
The fact that our markets are the safest in the world has helped make them the strongest in the 
world.’” Id. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 12. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 1804–11. 
 13. Elizabeth Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the United States Needs a 
Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 28–39 (2005). Bills have been 
introduced into both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate to create an Office of 
National Insurance within the U.S. Department of the Treasury to regulate insurance at the federal 
level for the first time. See H.R. 3200, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. (2007); S. 40, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(2007). 
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Table 1: Countries with Either an Integrated or Semi-
Integrated Financial Services Agency14 
Single Agency Supervising Two Types of Financial 
Intermediaries 
Single Supervisor for Financial 
Services (Year Created) 
Banks and Securities 
Firms 
Banks and Insurers Securities 
Firms and  
Insurers 
Austria (2002) 
Bahrain (2002) 
Cayman Islands 
(1997) 
Denmark (1988) 
Estonia (2002) 
Germany (2002) 
Gibraltar (1991) 
Hungary (2000) 
Iceland (1999) 
Ireland (2003) 
Japan (2000) 
Kazakhstan (2004) 
Latvia (2001) 
Maldives (1999) 
Malta (2002) 
Nicaragua 
Norway (1986) 
Singapore (1984) 
South Korea (1998) 
Sweden (1991) 
Taiwan (2004) 
UAE 
UK (1997) 
Dominican Republic 
Finland 
Luxembourg 
Mexico 
Switzerland 
Uruguay 
         Australia 
Belgium 
Canada 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Kazakhstan 
Malaysia 
Peru 
Saudi Arabia 
Venezuela 
Bolivia 
Bulgaria 
Chile 
Egypt 
Jamaica 
Mauritius 
Slovakia 
South 
Africa 
Ukraine 
 
The nations that adopted single regulators have found this approach to 
have several significant advantages over the multiple regulators that they 
previously had. First, the single regulator was better able to harmonize 
regulations across sectors, eliminate duplicative regulations, and address 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See José de Luna Martínez & Thomas A. Rose, International Survey of Integrated 
Financial Sector Supervision 13 tbl.4 (World Bank Fin. Sector Operations & Policy Dep’t, Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 3096, 2003); James R. Barth et al., A Cross-Country Analysis of 
Bank Supervisory Framework and Bank Performance, 12 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & 
INSTRUMENTS 67, 80 tbl.1 (2003); Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Act, 
2003 (Act No. 12/2003) (Ir.); Central Bank of Bahrain: Financial Sector Overview,  
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gaps than were the multiple regulators.15 Second, the single regulator was 
better situated to address the unique problems posed by financial 
conglomerates that operate in and across multiple sectors.16 Third, the 
single regulator was more cost-effective than the multiple ones.17 Finally, 
the single regulator was better for consumers, because it provided a one-
stop shop for filing complaints against financial service providers and a 
more uniform level of consumer protection.18 
When discussing whether the United States is losing its competitive 
edge relative to other nations in the area of financial services, commentators 
are not always clear about what they mean by competitiveness. One way of 
viewing competitiveness is to analyze the share of the global market for a 
particular financial service or product captured by financial institutions 
chartered or headquartered in the United States and compare how large it is 
relative to the share captured by firms from other nations. This view is the 
one that dominates many of the recent studies on the competitiveness of the 
U.S. financial services. Concerns about the loss of this type of 
competitiveness tend to be based on fears that it indicates a loss of national 
power and prestige if U.S. firms no longer capture the largest share of a 
particular financial market and on fears about the loss of jobs in particular 
cities or regions within the United States. 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.cbb.gov.bh/cmsrule/index.jsp?action=article&ID=16 (last visited Jan. 16, 2008); 
Bulgaria Financial Supervision Commission: About the Commission, http://www.fsc.bg/e_ 
fsc_page.asp?v=2 (last visited Jan. 18, 2008); Cayman Islands Monetary Authority: About Us, 
Some Events in the History of the Cayman Islands, http://www.cimoney.com.ky/section/ 
aboutus/default.aspx?id=41 (last visited Jan. 18, 2008); Dominica to Set Up a Single Financial 
Regulatory Body, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2003; Independent Financial Centre of the Americas, 
http://www.ifcamericas.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2008); Finland Ministry of Finance: Stability 
and Supervision http://www.vm.fi/vm/en/11_financial_market/05_stability_and_supervision/ 
index.jsp (last visited Jan. 18, 2008); Official Government of Gibraltar: Financial Services 
Commission, http://www.gibraltar.gov.uk/bus/finservcomm.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2008); 
Financial Services Commission of Jamaica: What We Do, http://www.fscjamaica.org/ 
content.php?action=content&id=61 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008); CENTRAL BANK OF ICELAND, 
ANNUAL REPORT 1999, 22 (2000), available at http://www.sedlabanki.is/uploads/files/ 
ark_99_3.pdf; INT’L MONETARY FUND, REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN: FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
STABILITY ASSESSMENT—UPDATE INCLUDING REPORTS ON THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS 
AND CODES ON THE FOLLOWING TOPICS: BANKING SUPERVISION AND ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 7 (Aug. 2004), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04268.pdf; Latvia Financial and Capital Markets 
Commission, http://www.fktk.lv/eng/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2008); SAUDI ARABIAN MONETARY 
AGENCY, A CASE STUDY ON GLOBALIZATION AND THE ROLE OF INSTITUTION BUILDING IN THE 
FINANCIAL SECTOR IN SAUDI ARABIA 12 (2004), available at http://www.sama.gov.sa/ 
en/news/2004-03/; About Finansinspektionen, http://www.fi.se/Templates/StartSectionPage_ 
842.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2008); Taiwan Combining Financial Regulators to Bring in 
Investors, TAIWAN NEWS, July 1, 2004; South Africa Financial Services Board, 
http://www.fsb.co.za/index.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). 
 15. See generally Brown, supra note 13 (discussing at length the advantages offered by a 
single financial regulator over a regime that uses multiple regulators). 
 16. Id. at 39–46. 
 17. Id. at 59–67. 
 18. Id. at 52–59. 
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This view of competitiveness places the competition by U.S. firms for 
market share in the financial services markets within the broader context of 
competition among nations. Nations compete in order to grow and develop. 
They compete for markets, technology, skills and investment in order to 
reduce poverty, increase living standards and create jobs.19 Governments 
play a significant role in either fostering or hindering this competition. 
Governments do this primarily by providing security, supporting the rule of 
law, absorbing extraordinary risks, managing the macro-economy, and 
either implicitly or explicitly implementing an industrial policy through a 
series of microeconomic choices.20 
Another way of viewing competitiveness examines whether the 
financial markets within a nation foster competition among firms. 
Economics views competitive markets as ones in which enough sellers and 
buyers for particular goods or services exist such that each firm providing 
the good or service is too small relative to the overall market to affect 
prices. These firms must be able to enter or exit the market in response to 
demand for a particular product or service. To the extent that financial 
markets in the United States are not competitive in this way, investors or 
customers are harmed because they may have access to a more limited 
range of products or services that may be of a lower quality and for which 
they must pay higher prices than if the financial services markets were 
competitive. This view of competitiveness is less concerned with measuring 
U.S. markets’ performance relative to the markets in other nations and is 
more concerned with measuring how U.S. markets are performing against 
the economic ideal of perfectly competitive markets. These very different 
views of what “U.S. competitiveness” means can lead to significantly 
different policy prescriptions.21 
                                                                                                                 
 19. RICHARD H. K. VIETOR, HOW COUNTRIES COMPETE: STRATEGY, STRUCTURE, AND 
GOVERNMENT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1 (2007). 
 20. Id. 
 21. For example, regulations that make it difficult for foreign insurance companies to enter the 
U.S. insurance markets may help U.S. insurance companies to capture a larger share of the global 
market for insurance, at least in the short term, because the United States market makes up such a 
large percentage of the global market. Such regulations, however, would reduce the level of 
competition within U.S. insurance markets and thus, harm consumers who would have a more 
limited range of suppliers of insurance from which to choose. In the long run, however, other 
nations may retaliate if the regulations seemed designed to protect U.S. firms and harm foreign 
firms by making it harder for U.S. insurance companies to operate in their markets. If the 
regulations are specifically aimed at harming foreign firms and arguably serve some other goal, 
such as protecting consumers from firms that have engaged in fraud, it decreases the likelihood 
that other nations will retaliate. 
  The importance of not undermining the amount of competition occurring within U.S. 
domestic markets in order to aid certain U.S. firms is evident when one considers the growth in 
financial assets held by U.S. households. The value of the total financial assets of U.S. households 
more than tripled from $8.8 trillion in 1986 to $37.4 trillion in 2006. INS. INFO. INST., FINANCIAL 
SERVICES FACT BOOK 2008 (2008), available at www.iii.org/financial2/banking/commercial 
[hereinafter FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2008]. The mix of financial assets held by U.S. 
households in banking, securities, and insurance products has not remained constant over this 
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Enhancing the competitiveness of U.S. markets so that they more 
closely approximate the economic ideal of perfectly competitive markets is 
just one of the goals of financial regulation that should not be sacrificed in 
order to enhance the competitive position and market shares of U.S. firms 
in the global marketplace. Other essential goals that should not be sacrificed 
include: 
1) The Protection of the General Public: Regulations to promote 
this goal generally are those that fully informed and fully 
rational investors, depositors and insurance policy holders 
would choose to protect themselves from problems like fraud.22 
2) The Elimination of Negative Externalities from Financial 
Failures: Regulations to promote this goal include prudential 
regulations to ensure that financial services institutions are 
solvent enough to meet their obligations to investors, depositors 
and insurance policy holders.23 
3) The Advancement of Various Equitable and Redistributive 
Objectives: Regulations to promote this goal include ones like 
banking regulations that encourage lending in certain markets 
in order to foster economic development.24 
4) The Promotion of Certain Aspects of Political Economy: 
Regulations to promote this goal include restrictions on 
commercial activities by financial holding companies.25 
5) The Elimination of Crime and International Terrorism: 
Regulations to promote this goal include anti-money laundering 
controls.26 
The United States government cannot support policies that enhance the 
competitiveness and market shares of U.S. firms while undermining these 
other goals. For example, completely deregulating financial services may 
greatly increase the market share of U.S. securities firms in the short term 
but it may lead to an increase in fraud on investors. Since almost 50% of 
households in the United States now own securities, permitting an increase 
in fraud may destroy the ability of these people to finance their retirements 
or their children’s college educations.27 It could have a disastrous effect on 
                                                                                                                 
twenty-year period. For example, securities made up roughly the same percentage of U.S. 
households’ financial assets in 1986 (31.6%) and in 2006 (35.8%) but in 1996 during the stock 
market boom, securities made up 43.6% of the total financial assets of U.S. households. Id. Thus, 
U.S. policymakers need to be concerned about creating and maintaining competitive markets in all 
financial products and services. 
 22. Howell Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence 
and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. REG. 253, 258–59 (2007). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Brown, supra note 13, at 63–64. 
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the U.S. economy in the long term. So competitiveness cannot be seen as 
the sole Holy Grail of financial services regulation. It is an important goal 
that may need to be balanced against the other goals of financial services 
regulation. 
This article examines what possible factors within the U.S. regulatory 
structure for financial services may be harming the competitive position of 
U.S. firms within the global markets. Section II examines how the U.S. 
regulatory structure may affect both the share of global financial markets 
captured by U.S. companies and the level of competition among financial 
services firms within the United States. Section III examines some of the 
available evidence regarding whether U.S. financial services firms are 
losing market share to other nations, and to what extent any loss of market 
share can be attributed to the U.S. regulatory structure. Given the breadth of 
the markets for financial services, it will not be possible in this article to 
examine in depth how U.S. financial services firms are doing in each 
product and service market. Instead, this article will focus primarily on 
those markets or firms about which prior studies have raised concerns. 
Section IV draws some conclusions based on the available evidence and 
makes some policy recommendations. 
II. EFFECTS OF THE U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE ON 
COMPETITIVENESS 
The existing studies tend to blame the erosion of U.S. competitiveness 
in the financial services arena primarily on two factors: overregulation and 
the litigious environment in the United States.28 Both of these problems 
deter foreign firms from entering or investing in the United States, and 
encourage U.S. firms to minimize their exposure to U.S. markets. Both of 
these factors can increase the costs of doing business for firms that choose 
to or must operate within the United States, and these higher costs can 
potentially put these firms at a competitive disadvantage to other firms not 
saddled with these costs. Gaps in regulation or the absence of appropriate 
regulation, however, also can undermine the competitiveness of the United 
States by eroding the trust necessary to make the financial markets work 
properly. The regulatory structure can be the root cause of all of these 
problems. 
A. REGULATION 
In the area of financial services, government regulators promulgate 
laws and regulations concerning the licensing and operations of banks, 
securities firms, and insurance companies and their respective services and 
                                                                                                                 
 28. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., INTERIM REPORT, supra note 4, at 45–48; U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE COMM’N REPORT, supra note 4, at 6–10; MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 73–89; 
FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 11–15. 
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products. While these regulations may encourage confidence that the 
financial institutions and markets are trustworthy and encourage customers 
and investors to buy their products and services, they may also make it 
more difficult for new firms to enter the markets. This is particularly true if 
the firms will be subject to duplicative and inconsistent regulations from 
different regulatory agencies. Some firms may decide not to offer their 
services in a particular nation if they determine that the costs involved with 
satisfying these entry requirements outweigh the expected benefits of being 
in that market. In addition, to the extent that regulations may limit the 
ability of firms to exit a market if it proves less profitable than they hoped, 
such regulations may deter a firm from entering in the first place if they are 
not confident about their chances for success. This problem of inconsistent 
and duplicative regulation is more likely to occur when multiple regulators 
exist than when a single regulator is responsible for the financial services 
industry. 
The markets for banking, securities and insurance goods and services 
are no longer distinct, but overlap in many areas today. For example, money 
market accounts offered by securities firms compete with checking and 
savings accounts offered by banks. In addition, hybrid products that 
combine banking and securities attributes, securities and insurance 
attributes, or banking and insurance attributes have become more prevalent 
in recent years. Variable annuities, which combine life insurance features 
with securities features, are one example of these hybrid instruments. 
As a result of these changes in financial services, regulatory structures 
that rely on multiple regulators, such as the United States, may overregulate 
when compared to structures that use a single regulator because multiple 
regulators produce overlapping and conflicting regulations.29 Burdensome 
regulations can be a barrier to entry that decreases competition because the 
compliance costs may make it unprofitable for some firms to enter the 
market or to provide certain products. 
1. Duplicative and Inconsistent Regulations 
The United States has over 115 different state and federal agencies that 
regulate some aspect of the financial services industry. Each of these 
agencies generates regulations to govern its sphere of influence. 
Unfortunately, these spheres of influence overlap.30 Banks and securities 
                                                                                                                 
 29. On the other hand, multiple regulatory structures may produce more efficient and less 
burdensome regulation than a single regulator if the multiple regulators engage in regulatory 
competition. HELEN A. GARTEN, US FINANCIAL REGULATION AND THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 
135–38 (2001) (describing the opposition to a single regulator because of a “preference for 
federalism, fear of big government and faith in the power of regulatory competition”); Roberta 
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 
2359, 2360 (1998) (arguing that states should play a greater role in securities regulation because 
of the benefits of regulatory competition). 
 30. Brown, supra note13, at 24–36. 
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firms are regulated at both the federal and state levels. A nationally 
chartered bank must comply with rules and regulations issued by the 
Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). A state chartered bank 
that is a member of the Federal Reserve system must comply with the rules 
and regulations promulgated by Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the state 
banking regulator that issued the bank’s charter. If a life insurance company 
wants to operate in all fifty states, it must obtain a license from each state in 
order to do business and a license for each of its products or services from 
all fifty states, as well as comply with regulations issued by the SEC and the 
state securities regulators governing any hybrid insurance/securities 
products, like variable annuities. If a firm is a financial conglomerate 
offering banking, securities, and insurance, it may have to comply with the 
rules and regulations of a range of state and federal agencies, including the 
Federal Reserve, the OCC, the FDIC, the Office of Thrift Supervision 
(OTS), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the SEC, the 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), the Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation (SIPC) and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), 
as well as the state banking, securities and insurance regulators. Thus, 
financial services firms frequently find themselves having to comply with 
duplicative regulations from different regulators. Numerous studies have 
identified the problem of overlapping regulatory authorities producing 
inconsistent regulations, including the Commission on Organization of the 
Executive Branch of Government (the Hoover Commission), which 
recommended consolidating federal banking regulators as early as 1949, 
and the 2004 U.S. General Accountability Office’s report on Financial 
Regulation—Industry Changes Prompt Need to Reconsider U.S. Regulatory 
Structure.31 Another study, on the effect of state insurance regulation on 
insurance firms that operate in more than one state,32 found that the 
duplicative nature of state regulations resulted in (1) “multiple state reviews 
of product filings [that] are cumbersome and inefficient” and (2) 
“significant delays in multi-state company licensing [] inhibit[ed] the ability 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 
564 n.371 (2000); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-61, FINANCIAL REGULATION: 
INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE 75–76 (Oct. 
2004) [hereinafter GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT]. 
 32. Insurance companies must obtain a license from each state in which they do business and a 
license for each of their products or services in each such state, as well as comply with regulations 
issued by the SEC and the state securities regulators governing any hybrid insurance/securities 
products, like variable annuities. Brown, supra note 13, at 24–36. 
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of smaller companies to expand operations to the benefit of larger 
companies with pre-established multi-state infrastructures.”33 
Federal and state regulatory agencies have made some attempts to 
eliminate duplicative and inconsistent regulations. For example, federal 
banking regulators now jointly issue regulations and the OCC, OTS, and the 
FDIC adopted a uniform application form for obtaining a charter and 
federal deposit insurance.34 The National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) has worked to set up a centralized system for filing 
and approving insurance products to be provided in multiple states, 
although its efforts have met with very limited success.35 Nevertheless, no 
inter-agency forum currently exists in the United States in which all of the 
state and federal financial services regulators can meet to share information, 
assess risks that cross traditional regulatory sectors, and develop and 
coordinate regulations to address risks.36 The lack of this type of forum is 
particularly problematic when one considers that no recent financial crisis 
affecting the United States fell within the jurisdiction of any single federal 
or state financial services regulator.37 
While federal and state regulators have made some attempts to 
cooperate and coordinate activities, at other times they have spent 
significant amounts of time and money fighting with each other over who 
has the right to issue regulations or the final say over whether those 
                                                                                                                 
 33. SHEILA BAIR, UNIV. MASS. ISENBERG SCH. MGMT., CONSUMER RAMIFICATIONS OF AN 
OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTER FOR LIFE INSURERS, at i–ii (2004), available at 
http://www.isenberg.umass.edu/finopmgt/Faculty/Profiles/Sheila_Bair/. 
 34. Regulators Issue Common Form, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., Aug. 2002, at 
17. 
 35. NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, INTERSTATE INSURANCE PRODUCT REGULATION COMPACT 
(2003); NATIONAL TREATMENT & COORDINATION (EX) WORKING GROUP, NAIC DRAFT 2004 
WORK PLAN (2004). 
 36. See generally Brown, supra note 13. 
The existing inter-agency forums include the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council (FFIEC), the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
(the President’s Working Group), the Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure 
Committee (FBIIC), the Financial Literacy and Education Commission, the North 
American Securities Administrators Association, the Conference of State Banking 
Supervisors (CSBS), and NAIC. 
Id. at 29. FFIEC, the President’s Working Group, and FBIIC have the broadest range of 
regulators. FFIEC consists of the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the NCUA, the OCC, and the OTS. 
The President’s Working Group consists of the heads of the Federal Reserve, the SEC, the CFTC, 
and the Treasury. The FBIIC consists of representatives from the Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, 
OTS, SEC, CFTC, NCUA, NAIC, CSBS, OFHEO, the Federal Housing Finance Board, the Office 
of Homeland Security, and the Office of Cyberspace Security. Id. at 29–30. “None of these groups 
currently has the authority, jurisdiction or resources to ensure the systematic sharing of 
information between regulators in order to coordinate their activities and to assess the systemic 
risks to the financial industry as a whole.” Id. at 30. 
 37. GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 31, at 110. 
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regulations apply to particular institutions.38 These battles, like the one 
fought between the SEC and CFTC in the 1980s over who would regulate 
securities futures, have been well documented.39 These turf wars continue to 
this day. In response to the Interim Report of the Committee on Capital 
Markets Regulation, the report of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets, and the McKinsey 
Report, which all supported measures to reduce the role of states in 
regulating national financial services firms as a means of reducing 
overregulation of national firms, the North American Securities 
Administrators Association (NASAA) issued a statement that it would 
“continue to vigorously defend their authority to regulate at the state level” 
and it would “remain vigilant in fighting” attempts to have federal 
regulators preempt state regulatory authority.40 
Given the inability of federal and state agencies to effectively cooperate 
with one another, it is unlikely that a significant reduction in inconsistent or 
duplicative regulations can be made in the United States without 
consolidating some of the existing regulators. The experience of the United 
Kingdom shows that such consolidation can be effective in reducing the 
regulatory burden in a country: When the United Kingdom created its 
Financial Services Authority by consolidating the prior self-regulatory 
organizations and government agencies that dealt with financial services 
into one entity, it was able to streamline the regulations under which UK 
financial services firms operated. The UK FSA shortened the Code of 
Market Conduct by 30%, reduced the listing rules for new securities by 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See Brown, supra note 13, at 64–65; NASAA: State Securities Regulators Want Congress 
to Ensure Their Authority, Sec. L. Daily (BNA) (Jan. 31, 2008). 
 39. See Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and 
Derivatives Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L 
L. 319, 362 (2003). 
 40. NASAA: State Securities Regulators Want Congress to Ensure Their Authority, Sec. L. 
Daily (BNA) (Jan. 31, 2008). The NASAA supports measures to strengthen cooperation between 
state, federal and industry regulators. Id. The NASAA is a voluntary association of the securities 
administrators in the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, 
Canada, and Mexico. About NASAA, available at http://www.nasaa.org/About_NASAA/. As a 
result, it lacks any authority to make binding commitments on behalf of the state securities 
regulators. Thus, any cooperation efforts between state and federal regulators require the 
individual assent of each of the fifty states, which is not always easy to obtain. It is not clear what 
NASAA’s vision of cooperation would entail. The NASAA and its members appear unwilling to 
cede regulatory authority to any other regulator. For example, variable annuities are a hybrid 
insurance-securities product, which is currently regulated by the state insurance regulators, the 
state securities regulators and the SEC. The NASAA and its members have made it clear that they 
do not want to allow the state insurance regulators to become the sole agencies permitted to 
regulate these products. NASAA: State Securities Regulators Want Congress to Ensure Their 
Authority, Sec. L. Daily (BNA) (Jan. 31, 2008). Instead, the NASAA and its members want to 
retain their authority to bring enforcement actions and other measures against companies and 
individuals who sell them. In this case, “cooperation” seems to mean that every agency simply 
retains the right to regulate and bring enforcement actions and does not appear to contemplate any 
reduction in the overlapping regulations or regulatory authority. 
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40%, and “cut 200 pages from the provisions on collective investment 
schemes.”41 
2. Regulatory Costs 
Financial services firms generally try to pass the cost of regulation on to 
their clients, and those that cannot struggle to stay in business.42 Some 
studies suggest that the high costs of the U.S. system make U.S. financial 
services firms less competitive, because those costs either are passed along 
to clients or borne by U.S. financial services firms.43 In head-to-head 
comparisons with other nations, the U.S. regulatory regime appears to be 
significantly more expensive than the regimes that employ a single financial 
services regulator.44 
The UK FSA publishes a chart in its annual report comparing its costs 
with the costs of the financial services regulatory regimes in the United 
States, Germany, France, Hong Kong, Ireland, and Singapore.45 
Unfortunately, the UK FSA has not included all of the costs for the over 
115 different state and federal agencies that regulate financial services in 
the United States, nor has it been consistent with regard to which U.S. 
agencies it does include.46 This means that the UK FSA report actually 
                                                                                                                 
 41. HANDBOOK DEV. (Fin. Servs. Auth., U.K.), Dec. 2004, at 2, available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/handbook/HB58.pdf. 
 42. See, e.g., STEVEN W. POTTIER, AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, STATE REGULATION OF 
LIFE INSURERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND FINANCIAL STRENGTH 6 (2007), 
available at http://www.acli.com/NR/rdonlyres/3A7453E3-FDF9-44DC-9A5B-66A41C949F97/ 
9195/PottierPackage3.pdf (providing a relevant study on insurance companies’ practices). For a 
study regarding the securities industry, see OXERA CONSULTING LTD., THE COST OF CAPITAL: AN 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 4 (2006), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/ 
rdonlyres/B032122B-B1DA-4E4A-B1C8-42D2FAE8 EB01/0/Costofcapital_full.pdf. This study, 
for the London Stock Exchange, found that underwriting fees for a listing on one of the European 
exchanges run between 3–4% on average, while underwriting fees for similar transactions in the 
U.S. were 6.5–7% on average. Id. As a result, the IPO proceeds received by the listing companies 
were at least 3% lower in the U.S. than in Europe. Id. Initial listing fees, legal, accounting and 
advisory fees did not appear to be significantly different across markets, although professional 
fees in New York tended to be higher than London, Frankfurt and Paris. The higher legal and 
accounting fees were largely attributed to the costs of complying with the U.S. securities 
regulations. Id. 
 43. Brown, supra note 4, at 67. 
 44. See OXERA CONSULTING LTD., supra note 42. 
 45. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 2003/04 app.5 at 99–103 (2004) [hereinafter FSA 
ANNUAL REPORT 2003/04]; FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05 app.5 at 111–14 
(2005) [hereinafter FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05]; FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 
2005/06 app.5 at 101–04 (2006) [hereinafter FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2005/06]. 
 46. For example, in 2002/03, 2003/04, the UK FSA included the budgets for the Office of 
Thrift Supervision in the U.S. Department of Treasury and the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) but left the budgets for these organizations out of the charts in later years. FIN. 
SERVS. AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 2002/03 app.8 at 205–10 (2003) [hereinafter FSA ANNUAL 
REPORT 2002/03]; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2003/04, supra note 45, app. 5 at 99–103; FSA 
ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05, supra note 45, app.5 at 111–14; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2005/06, 
supra note 45, app.5 at 101–04. As a result, the UK FSA numbers underestimate the regulatory 
costs of the U.S. system. On July 30, 2007, the regulatory, risk assessment, enforcement, and 
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underestimates the already high costs it reports for state and federal 
regulation of financial services in the United States. The data collected by 
the UK FSA for comparison with its 2002/03 fiscal year placed the total 
annual regulatory costs incurred by the United States at approximately 
twelve times the total annual regulatory costs for the UK FSA.47 The total 
regulatory costs for the United States for 2002 would be more than sixteen 
times the annual expenses of the UK FSA if all of the annual expenses for 
the federal and state agencies that regulate financial services were 
combined.48 
The following table provides an idea of how much more expensive the 
U.S. system is when compared with the UK FSA. 
Table 2: Total Financial Service Regulatory Expenditures (in 
millions of constant 2000 US dollars)49 
                                                                                                                 
arbitration functions of the NASD and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) were consolidated 
to form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Actually achieving a single 
rulebook for FINRA may take until 2009. Stephen Joyce, Securities: Consolidation of NASD, 
NYSE Rules Could Take Until ‘09, FINRA’s Merrill Says, Banking Daily (BNA) (Oct. 26, 2007). 
 47. FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2002/03, supra note 46, app.8 at 207. In each of its annual reports, 
the UK FSA raised the following caveats regarding the comparability of the data collected: (1) the 
figures do not necessarily relate to the same accounting period and may not have been compiled 
on the same basis; (2) labor and other costs vary between countries; (3) variations in exchange 
rates will affect the results expressed in a single currency; (4) the scope of the responsibility of the 
regulatory authorities differ from one country to the next; and (5) the nature and scale of the 
financial services industries in different countries differs materially. Id. at app.8 at 205–10; FSA 
ANNUAL REPORT 2003/04, supra note 45, app.5 at 99–103; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05, 
supra note 45, app.5 at 111–14; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2005/06, supra note 45, app.5 at 101–04. 
 48. Brown, supra note 13, at 60–61. 
 49. FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2003/04, supra note 45, app.5 at 99; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 
2004/05, supra note 45, app.5 at 111; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2005/06, supra note 45, app.5 at 
101. To make the comparisons between the numbers provided in the 2003/04 chart and charts for 
2004/05 and 2005/06, the amounts for the OTS and the NASD were subtracted from the total 
regulatory costs listed for the United States for 2003/04. In addition, the total expenditures for 
each country and the total GDP for each country were translated into constant 2000 US dollars to 
eliminate the effects of inflation in each country. 
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As the table illustrates, the United States spent at least 7.7 times more 
than the United Kingdom and at least 35.1 times more than Germany to 
regulate financial services in 2003. The ratios did not alter significantly 
between 2003 and 2005. Even if one accounts for the differences in the 
gross domestic product (GDP) of each country, the United States still 
spends substantially more than the United Kingdom and Germany. In 2003, 
the United States spent 28.9% more than the United Kingdom and 689% 
more than Germany to regulate financial services after accounting for 
GDP.50 Between 2003 and 2005, the gap between the United States and the 
United Kingdom narrowed, although the gap between the United States and 
Germany did not change much.51 In 2005, the United States spent 19.4% 
more than the United Kingdom and 663% more than Germany to regulate 
financial services.52 The gap between the United States and the United 
Kingdom narrowed, in part, because the UK FSA assumed the 
responsibility for regulating both mortgage and general insurance 
intermediation for the first time in 2004/05.53 
Table 3: Total Financial Service Regulatory Expenditures per 
million dollars of GDP (in constant 2000 U.S. dollars)54 
 
                                                                                                                 
 50. FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2002/03, supra note 46, app.8 at 205–10; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 
2003/04, supra note 45, app.5 at 99–103; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05, supra note 45, app.5 at 
111–14; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2005/06, supra note 45, app.5 at 101–04. 
 51. FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2002/03, supra note 46, app.8 at 205–10; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 
2003/04, supra note 45, app.5 at 99–103; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05, supra note 45, app.5 at 
111–14; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2005/06, supra note 45, app.5 at 101–04. 
 52. FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2002/03, supra note 46, app.8 at 205–10; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 
2003/04, supra note 45, app.5 at 99–103; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05, supra note 45, app.5 at 
111–14; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2005/06, supra note 45, app.5 at 101–04. 
 53. See FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05, supra note 45, at 10–11. 
 54. FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2002/03, supra note 46, app.8 at 205–10; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 
2003/04, supra note 45, app.5 at 99–103; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05, supra note 45, app.5 at 
111–14; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2005/06, supra note 45, app.5 at 101–04. 
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The lower regulatory costs imposed on financial services firms in other 
nations provides a competitive advantage for those nations. The costs for 
financial services in the United States generally are covered by the fees that 
financial services firms pay to the state and federal regulators.55 As 
previously noted, financial services firms attempt to pass these costs onto 
their clients. 
While the United States system is more expensive, it is not completely 
clear how much the United States might save if it consolidated its 
regulators. While useful in making clear how expensive the U.S. regime is, 
the comparisons done to date on the regulatory costs spent by nations on 
financial services have failed to account for a number of other significant 
factors that may contribute to these cost differences. These factors include: 
• Differences in composition and sophistication of the financial 
services industry; 
• Differences in regulatory objectives; 
• Differences in resource endowments, like wages, capital costs 
and education; 
• Differences in enforcement intensity; and 
• Differences in the degree to which the population respects the 
law. 
Unless these differences are accounted for, one cannot say with any 
degree of certainty that switching from the U.S. regulatory model to the UK 
FSA’s model will produce significant cost savings. 
The states within the United States also use a range of regulatory 
models from a separate regulator for each financial service to having all 
financial services regulated by a single agency. An examination of the costs 
associated with these state regulatory models would enable one to eliminate 
or significantly reduce many of the differences that arise when comparing 
national regimes. A preliminary examination of the costs of the state 
regulatory regimes in the United States does not reveal that states which 
employ a single financial services regulator spend significantly less than 
those that use multiple regulators.56 This study therefore casts doubt on the 
assertion that the United States could reduce its regulatory costs and thereby 
potentially enhance the competitive positions of U.S. financial service firms 
by moving to a single financial service regulatory model. 
                                                                                                                 
 55. THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE CHARTERED 
BANKING 2002-2003, at 36–38 (19th ed. 2003); NAIC, INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCES 
BOOK 27–32 (2006). 
 56. See Elizabeth F. Brown, A Preliminary Look at Regulatory Structures for Financial 
Services (Univ. St. Thomas Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-42, 2007), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/asbtract=1008961. 
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3. Regulatory Gaps 
The structure of the financial markets is changing in the United States 
and around the world. More products and institutions are being created that 
do not neatly fit within the traditional categories of banking, insurance, and 
securities. In addition, businesses and other entities increasingly rely on 
capital markets for raising funds rather than borrowing them from 
traditional commercial banks.57 This process of disintermediation is having 
a profound impact on the financial services markets.58 In particular, it is 
increasing the number and variety of entities that may create systemic risks 
for the financial system.59 While no single, clear definition for systemic risk 
exists, the common elements of the current definitions are that systemic risk 
entails a triggering event that causes a chain of events resulting in negative 
economic consequences to financial institutions or markets.60 These chains 
of events are possible because banks and other financial institutions and 
markets are so closely intertwined.61 
Systemic risks are risks to the financial system.62 Market forces, 
however, are not sufficient to encourage firms operating within the financial 
system to reduce their systemic risk (and correspondingly their potential 
profits) in order to maintain the stability of the financial system as a 
whole.63 Professor Steven Schwarcz has characterized this problem as a 
“type of tragedy of the commons.”64 As a result, some forms of financial 
regulation are necessary in order to promote economic efficiency and force 
firms to internalize the externalities to the financial system caused by their 
risky behaviors.65 The fragmentary nature of the existing U.S. regulatory 
structure, however, was not designed, nor is it able, to deal with the 
problems posed by hybrid products and institutions and by the spread of 
systemic risks to entities and markets outside of banking. 
Attempts to deal with these hybrid products and institutions are often at 
the root of many of the turf wars between the federal and state banking, 
securities and insurance regulators. These wars often result in significant 
regulatory gaps, which harm the industry, investors, and customers. The 
current subprime mortgage crisis is simply the most recent example of state 
and federal agencies allowing regulatory gaps to arise while they debated 
who should regulate the various players that gave rise to the crisis. 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk 8–9 (Duke Law Sch., Legal Studies Paper No. 163, 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008326. 
 58. See id. at 8. Disintermediation means removing the intermediaries, like banks, from the 
process of accessing capital. Id. 
 59. See id. at 8–11. 
 60. Id. at 4–15. 
 61. Id. at 8–11. 
 62. Id. at 18. 
 63. Schwarcz, supra note 57, at 15–17. 
 64. Id. at 17. 
 65. Id. at 15–17. 
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The subprime mortgage crisis involves the following entities, among 
others: the mortgage brokers who sold the loans, the banks who made the 
loans, the international loan market that allowed loans to be traded like 
stocks on an exchange, the special purpose vehicles created to buy the loans 
from the banks, the investment banks that helped create the special purpose 
vehicles and helped repackage the loans as securities, the credit rating 
agencies, and the bond insurance firms that provided guarantees for 
complex mortgage debt. Mortgage brokers were regulated in some states by 
the state banking regulators, but in other states they were unregulated. As 
noted above, the banks were regulated by the following banking regulators: 
the state banking authority, OCC, FDIC, and the Federal Reserve. The 
special purpose vehicles, the investment banks, and the credit rating 
agencies were regulated by the SEC and the state securities regulators. The 
SEC and the state regulators, however, subjected the credit rating agencies 
to very little regulation. Finally, the bond insurance companies were 
regulated by the state insurance regulators.66 
The banking regulators do not appear to have considered the impact of 
the loans once they were securitized and failed to catch and root out the soft 
fraud perpetuated by some mortgage originators who disclosed misleading 
and inaccurate information to the rating agencies.67 The securities regulators 
did not consider how the loans underlying the securities were created and 
did not appear to grasp that rating agencies had failed to adequately account 
for the loosening underwriting standards when assigning ratings.68 The 
insurance regulators failed to consider how potential regulatory failures by 
the banking and securities regulators might harm insurance companies, 
particularly the ones insuring the mortgage securities.69 In addition, the lack 
of transparency in the financial markets for structured products meant that 
neither investors nor regulators were aware of who precisely held the 
subprime mortgage risk.70 Not surprisingly, federal and state regulators 
were played off against each other by elements within the financial services 
sector, such as the mortgage lenders, which claimed that they were policing 
themselves and therefore, additional state or federal regulation was 
unnecessary.71 In the end, the failure of the U.S. regulators to consider the 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, A Warning on Insurers Frays Nerves, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
2008, at C1. William A. Ackerman, a manager of the Pershing Square hedge fund, issued a report 
that predicted that MBIA and Ambac Financial Group, two bond insurance companies, might lose 
up to $24 billion on mortgage investments that they guaranteed. Id. Those two companies 
guarantee more than $1 trillion in municipal, corporate and mortgage debt. Id. 
 67. U.K. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., FINANCIAL RISK OUTLOOK 2008, at 9 (2008). 
 68. Id. at 22. 
 69. Bajaj & Creswell, supra note 66. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Stephen Joyce, Mortgages: State Regulator Seeks Help to Police Mortgage Industry; 
Lauds Frank Bill, NMLS, Banking Daily (BNA) (Dec. 4, 2007). North Carolina Bank 
Commissioner Joseph Smith chided the mortgage industry for “trying to play rope-a-dope with 
Congress and with the agencies” and accused it of failing to police itself. Id. 
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entire series of transactions as a whole and to tailor regulations to the 
systemic risks that these transactions could, and did, pose resulted in the 
current crisis. 
The subprime crisis has harmed the profitability of U.S. financial 
institutions and weakened their ability to compete with those of other 
nations. An alarming number of Americans are now facing foreclosure of 
their homes as a result of this crisis while others are unable to obtain loans 
due to the credit crunch brought on by the crisis. While deregulation or the 
absence of regulation is frequently touted as a means of making markets 
more competitive, in the case of the subprime crisis, the failure of the 
multiple U.S. regulators to provide the appropriate level of regulation has 
had the opposite effect. 
Regulatory regimes that rely on an integrated regulator or a semi-
integrated regulator theoretically should be better positioned to deal both 
with hybrid products and institutions, and with the systemic risks posed by 
entities other than traditional banks, than the multiple regulators employed 
by the United States for the reasons suggested above. Of the eighteen 
nations that the McKinsey Report classifies as “mature” financial markets 
because of the level of capital markets penetration, fifteen of them either 
have an integrated or a semi-integrated regulatory regime.72 The only ones 
that do not are the United States, France, and Italy.73 Many, if not all, of the 
fifteen nations that employ an integrated or a semi-integrated regulatory 
regime deliberately adopted it in order to deal with the increasing number of 
financial conglomerates and hybrid products.74 By failing to adopt a 
regulatory structure that can deal with the new hybrid products and 
institutions and the growing threat of systemic risks posed by entities other 
than traditional banks, the United States may well place its financial 
markets and firms at a competitive disadvantage with those of other 
financially mature nations. 
B. LITIGATION 
Another reason often advanced for why the United States is losing its 
competitive edge is the number and cost of the lawsuits brought against 
financial institutions in the United States.75 The United States is perceived 
as presenting corporations with a significantly more litigious environment 
                                                                                                                 
 72. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 40. Capital markets penetration is defined as the 
private debt and equity as a percentage of gross domestic product of a nation. It provides evidence 
of the level of disintermediation occurring within a nation. Banking traditionally is the bedrock for 
the financial services industry in most countries with securities and insurance playing subordinate 
roles to it. As financial markets mature, businesses become increasingly willing and able to bypass 
banks and other financial intermediaries in order to obtain financing directly through the capital 
markets. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Martínez & Rose, supra note 14. 
 75. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 16–17. 
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than any other country in the world. This is due in part to the relative ease 
with which one can bring a class action lawsuit in the United States and in 
part to the enforcement efforts by state and federal financial services 
regulators. 
1. Private Class Actions 
Private litigation in the United States imposes significant monetary 
sanctions on financial services firms operating within the United States.76 
During the 2002–2004 period, an average of almost $3.5 billion per year of 
private monetary sanctions were imposed on firms and individuals in the 
U.S. securities markets.77 Most of this amount was due to settlements of 
class action lawsuits, although $160 million of it was from NASD 
arbitrational awards.78 
Traditionally, private litigation seeking to enforce the financial services 
regulations was a unique feature of the United States, as such actions were 
negligible in other jurisdictions.79 This difference was due in part to the fact 
that other jurisdictions either do not permit private class action lawsuits to 
be brought or had rules that discourage lawsuits that have a marginal chance 
of success. For example, the United Kingdom discourages frivolous or 
weak suits by employing a “loser pays” rule under which the losing party in 
a suit must not only cover his own attorneys’ fees but must pay those of the 
winning side as well.80 
The differences between the U.S. regime and those of other nations may 
decrease in the future for two reasons. First, European countries are making 
it easier to bring class action-style law suits in the form of “group litigation” 
or “representative actions or proceedings.”81 In the United Kingdom, 
representative actions have been available for two centuries but were rarely 
used due to narrow court interpretations, but they are now being used more 
frequently where declaratory or injunctive relief is sought.82 In addition, the 
European Directive on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers, which 
was passed into law in 2000, permits group litigation.83 Although the 
directive focuses on injunctions, damages may be sought in some 
countries.84 In addition, several countries, including the United Kingdom, 
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the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, have adopted laws that 
permit class-action types of litigation.85 
Second, while securities class actions have fluctuated over the years, 
they may be occurring less frequently in the United States. This seems more 
likely to be true if one excludes actions that are likely to be due to short-
term phenomena, such as the options backdating and the subprime crisis.86 
Over the past decade securities class actions have averaged about 194 per 
year.87 Between 2005 and 2007 securities class actions, excluding those 
relating to options backdating and the subprime crisis, declined by over 
28% from 176 to 126.88 
Table 4: Number of Securities Class Actions89 
 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. at 8. 
 86. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS 2007: A YEAR IN 
REVIEW 5 (2008). 
 87. Id. 
 88. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 86, at 5; Joseph A. Grundfest, The Class-Action 
Market, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2007, at A15. 
 89. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 86, at 5. 
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One explanation for this decline is that there has been less fraud as a 
result of the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and tougher SEC and 
Justice Department enforcement actions.90 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 
conducted over 5,428 interviews of chief executive officers, chief financial 
officers, and other executives concerning crime prevention and detection in 
their companies.91 This survey found that accounting fraud in the United 
States declined from 36% in 2005 to 13% in 2007.92 In addition, over 70% 
of U.S. respondents found that the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements had been 
at least marginally effective in detecting economic crime.93 
2. Government Enforcement Efforts 
Even if the difference between the threat of private litigation in the 
United States and the rest of the world declines, financial services firms will 
continue to view the threat of governmental legal action against them as 
being higher in the United States because of the enforcement actions of the 
state and federal regulators. Each of the over 115 regulators in the United 
States has the power to bring enforcement actions against the firms that it 
regulates. Depending on the regulatory agency, these enforcement actions 
can be for either criminal or civil penalties. 
In addition, once one agency decides to bring an enforcement action, it 
is not uncommon for other state or federal agencies to bring additional 
actions against the same alleged violator. In fact, actions by government 
regulators and self-regulatory organizations make up the vast majority of 
the enforcement actions faced by financial services firms. For example, 
during the period from 2002–2004, class action lawsuits made up just 3.3% 
of the securities regulations enforcement actions brought, while the SEC, 
the Department of Justice, state agencies, the NASD and the NYSE brought 
the remaining 96.7% of the actions.94 The sanctions imposed by these 
actions were substantial. Monetary sanctions averaged over $5.3 billion per 
year.95 At the federal level, approximately 4,200 months of prison time plus 
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over 1,500 months of probation per year were imposed on average during 
the 2002–2004 period.96 
If one compares the level of public enforcement actions against 
financial services firms in the United States with those in other nations with 
roughly similar laws and levels of economic development, one finds that 
the intensity of U.S. enforcement efforts is higher than that of most other 
jurisdictions, even after accounting for differences in the size of the 
domestic markets.97 For example, in the area of securities enforcement, the 
state and federal securities regulators in the United States brought an 
average of 224 actions per trillion dollars of stock market capitalization 
during the 2002–2004 period.98 By contrast, the UK FSA averaged only 
twenty-five actions per trillion dollars of stock market capitalization, and 
the German BaFin brought ninety actions per trillion dollars of stock market 
capitalization.99 
The sanctions imposed by U.S. authorities also appear to be 
significantly higher than those imposed by the regulators of other nations. 
In the 2002–2004 period, U.S. securities regulators imposed monetary 
sanctions averaging $326 million per trillion dollars of stock market 
capitalization while the UK FSA only imposed an average of $9 million per 
trillion dollars of stock market capitalization.100 While Germany’s BaFin 
did not provide comparable data, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
Germany’s BaFin imposed even lower amounts of monetary sanctions than 
the UK FSA imposed.101 
Thus, the U.S. regulatory structure imposes higher costs on U.S. 
financial firms, which may be a drag on their competitiveness in global 
markets. The U.S. regulatory structure also may fail to foster the 
appropriate level of competition among firms within the United States by 
creating barriers to entry in the form of regulation and litigation. 
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III. EVIDENCE THAT U.S. FIRMS ARE LOSING GLOBAL 
MARKET SHARE 
The recent studies by McKinsey, the Financial Services Roundtable, the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital 
Markets in the 21st Century, and the Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation all provide empirical evidence, which they claim illustrates that 
the U.S. is losing its competitive edge.102 These studies almost exclusively 
focused on U.S. competitiveness in the area of securities and investment 
banking. As evidence of loss of competitiveness, these studies primarily 
examined the loss of market share in terms of IPOs, the increased 
willingness of U.S. companies to list abroad, the delisting of foreign 
corporations from U.S. exchanges, and the decline in cross-listing 
premiums. 
If one is going to assess the competitive standing of the United States in 
the area of financial services, one needs, however, to look at the broader 
market for financial services. Financial services cover a much larger 
spectrum of products than companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges. 
Financial services include banking and insurance products and firms, as 
well as securities and investment banking. In 2005, the GDP from financial 
services in the United States totaled $957.7 billion or about 8% of U.S. 
GDP.103 Of that amount, the securities industry only comprised 17.5%, 
while the remainder came from banking and insurance.104 
While the securities industry clearly is important to New York, it plays 
a less important role in most other states. The McKinsey Report noted that 
Connecticut, Delaware, North Carolina and South Dakota all employ major 
portions of their workforces in the financial services industry.105 What the 
McKinsey Report failed to mention is that the securities industry is not 
crucial to any of those states, except Connecticut. While 45% of New 
York’s GDP from financial services and 22.6% of Connecticut’s GDP from 
financial services are due to the securities industry, the percentage of the 
state GDP from financial services that is due to securities is only 3.1% in 
Delaware, 4.5% in North Carolina and 1.6% of South Dakota.106 In order to 
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make a more accurate assessment of whether U.S. financial services firms 
are losing market share to the financial services firms of other nations, a 
broad examination of financial markets and firms is undertaken below. 
A. MARKETS SHOWING EVIDENCE OF LOSS OF MARKET SHARE BY 
U.S. FIRMS 
1. Securities Markets 
a. Domestic Market Capitalization 
While the United States’ share of global market capitalization has 
fluctuated over the past twenty-five years, it has tended to decline over 
time. The United States’ share of the total global capitalization has risen 
and fallen as financial crises rocked the developing world and recessions 
adversely affected the U.S. markets. In 1983, the United States’ market 
capitalization of its equities represented 56.0% of the total global market 
capitalization.107 The United States’ share of total global market 
capitalization dropped to 34.7% during the 1994 recession in the United 
States.108 Then a series of financial crises in developing countries combined 
with the resurgence of the United States economy led to the longest stock 
market expansion in U.S. history. The Mexican peso crisis (1994–1995), 
the Asian financial crisis, and the Russian financial crisis (1998–1999) 
produced a “flight to quality,” as both western investors and local investors 
pulled their funds out of Asia, central and eastern Europe, and Latin 
America and reinvested them in more stable, developed markets, such as 
the United States. The share of total global market capitalization of stock 
exchanges in developed countries was only 82.3% by the end of 1992.109 
After the Mexican peso crisis, the developed nations’ share rose to 86.5% 
by the end of 1995. 
After the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the Russian financial crisis 
in 1998–1999, the developed nations’ share of total global market 
capitalization averaged about 90.2% for the period 1997–2001.110 By 1999, 
at the height of the dotcom bubble, the United States’ market capitalization 
had risen to 47.8% of the total global capitalization as tracked by the World 
Federation of Exchanges.111 When the dotcom bubble burst and a recession 
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in the United States followed, the developed nations’ share dropped to 
86.4% in 2002.112 The developed nations’ share has declined every year 
since 2002 even as the stock markets in these nations recovered and was 
only 78.0% in 2006.113 By 2006, the United States’ market capitalization 
was down to 37.4% of the total global market capitalization.114 
While the developed world as a whole has lost market share to the 
emerging markets, the United States lost market share to other developed 
markets from 2001 to 2006, as illustrated in the table below.115 Despite the 
warnings in the McKinsey Report and others, the United States does not 
appear to have lost market share to London between 2000 and 2006. 
London’s market share remains relatively constant between 2000 and 2006. 
Nevertheless, the United States does appear to be losing market share to the 
smaller developed countries like Spain and Australia and to the resurgence 
in the Japanese stock markets during this period.116 
Table 5: Domestic Market Capitalization as a Percentage of 
Developed Markets’ Capitalization117 
Countries 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
USA 54.3 57.6 56.0 53.9 52.7 51.1 48.6 
LSE 9.3 9.0 9.4 9.3 9.2 9.0 9.4 
Euronext 8.1 7.9 7.8 7.8 7.9 7.9 9.2 
Japan 11.3 9.4 10.5 11.2 11.5 13.9 11.9 
Spain 1.8 1.9 2.3 2.7 3.0 2.8 3.3 
Australia 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.7 
                                                                                                                 
(RTS). The members of the World Federation of Exchanges include American Stock Exchange, 
Amman Stock Exchange, Athens Exchange, Australian Securities Exchange, Bermuda Stock 
Exchange, BME Spanish Exchanges, Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires, Bolsa de Comercio de 
Santiago, Bolsa de Valores de Colombia, Bolsa de Valores de Lima, Bolsa de Valores do Sao 
Paulo-BVSP, Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, Bombay Stock Exchange Ltd., Borsa Italiana SPA, 
Bourse de Luxembourg, Bourse de Montreal, Budapest Stock Exchange Ltd., Bursa Malaysia, 
Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchanges, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Colombo Stock 
Exchange, Cyprus Stock Exchange, Deutsche Börse AG, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing, 
Indonesia Stock Exchange, International Securities Exchange, Irish Stock Exchange, Istanbul 
Stock Exchange, Jasdaq Securities Exchange, Inc., JSE Limited, Korea Exchange, Ljubljana Stock 
Exchange, London Stock Exchange, Malta Stock Exchange, Nasdaq Stock Market, National Stock 
Exchange of India Limited, New Zealand Exchange Ltd., NYSE Euronext, OMX Nordic 
Exchange, Osaka Securities Exchange, Oslo Børs, Philippine Stock Exchange, Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Singapore Exchange, Stock Exchange of Mauritius, Stock 
Exchange of Tehran, Stock Exchange of Thailand, SWX Swiss Exchange, Taiwan Stock 
Exchange Corp., Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange, Tokyo Stock Exchange Group, Inc., TSX Group, 
Warsaw Stock Exchange, and Wiener Borse AG. World Federation of Exchanges, Members, 
http://www.world-exchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?action=document&menu=54. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. World Federation of Stock Exchanges, supra note 109. 
2008] U.S. Financial Regulatory Structure & U.S. Competitiveness 395 
b. Market Share of IPOs 
The McKinsey Report and some of the other reports have focused on 
the fact that in 2006 and 2007, China eclipsed the United States in terms of 
total capital raised through IPOs and that in 2007 China eclipsed the United 
States in terms of the number of IPOs as evidence that the United States has 
lost its competitive edge.118 Until 2005, the United States was the number-
one country in terms of total capital raised in IPOs with $33 billion in 2005, 
representing almost 20% of the total capital raised that year.119 The United 
States was the number-one country in terms of the number of IPOs 
conducted in 2006 with 187 listings compared with China’s 175 listings.120 
China, however, raised $56.6 billion in 2006 (over 23% of the total capital 
raised worldwide through IPOs) compared with $34.1 billion in the United 
States.121 In 2007, China raised over $52.6 billion in the first eleven months 
of 2007 (over 20% of the total capital raised worldwide through IPOs) 
compared with $38.6 billion in the United States.122 In addition, China had 
the largest number of IPOs with 209 in 2007 (over 12% of the total number 
of IPOs worldwide in 2007) compared with 179 IPOs in the United 
States.123 
Many of these firms that did not elect to go public in the United States 
may have found U.S. markets less receptive because they could not meet 
the disclosure requirements under U.S. law or because they were not very 
good investments. Some companies clearly are choosing the London Stock 
Exchange because of its weaker disclosure and listing requirements. IPOs 
by Russian companies, in particular, were (until recently) choosing to list in 
London because of its weak regulatory environment.124 Another example of 
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a firm that elected to list in London because of its more lax disclosure and 
listing requirements was PartyGaming, an online casino operator, which 
listed on LSE in 2005.125 The IPO for PartyGaming raised $1.9 billion, all 
of which went to its founders, an American couple who live in Gibraltar.126 
The company used computers located on Native American lands, and 90% 
of its revenues came from U.S. residents despite the fact that online 
gambling was and is illegal for U.S. residents.127 The prospectus disclosed 
that the directors relied on the inability or unwillingness of U.S. officials to 
enforce the laws against online gambling.128 On October 13, 2006, the 
United States banned money transfers to offshore online gambling firms 
and the share price of PartyGaming plunged.129 Such a company would not 
have been able to list on the U.S. exchanges because the SEC would not 
have considered its risk disclosures adequate. In the wake of criticisms 
about the laxity of its regulatory environment, the London regulators have 
tightened listing requirements within the past year.130 As a result, some 
Russian corporations are now searching for a new exchange with looser 
legal procedures and financial reporting requirements than the London 
Stock Exchange’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM).131 
c. Market Share of Global IPOs 
In 2000, the United States hosted nine out of the ten largest IPOs in the 
world.132 In 2005 and 2006, the United States only hosted one of the 
twenty-five largest IPOs in the world.133 This decline is not necessarily 
solely due to a decrease in U.S. competitiveness. Many factors affect a 
corporation’s decision regarding where to list its securities. 
Geography is a major factor. The vast majority of corporations list their 
securities in their home markets. In 2006, 90% of corporations chose to list 
their shares in their home countries.134 The corporations that undertook 
almost all of the twenty largest IPOs decided to go public in their native 
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countries.135 Improvements in local liquidity and international investor 
willingness to invest in companies listed outside of the major exchanges 
have facilitated these listings.136 
In recent years, the corporations in emerging markets, particularly 
Brazil, Russia, India and China, were responsible for the largest IPOs. In 
2007, fourteen out of the twenty largest IPOs were by emerging-market 
corporations, up from nine out of the twenty largest IPOs in 2006.137 IPOs 
for Russian and Chinese companies were responsible for almost half of the 
value of the top twenty IPOs in 2006.138 In 2007 China had more IPOs, 
which raised more money than Russia, Brazil and India combined.139 
In addition, the types of companies bringing the largest IPOs in the late 
1990s and in 2000 were technology and financial services corporations 
based in the United States. More recently, para-statal corporations that 
emerging-market governments are taking public have represented the 
largest IPOs. For political reasons, these entities are not going to be listed in 
their home jurisdictions. For example, in recent years most Chinese 
corporations were forced to pick an exchange for their IPOs based on 
political or other non-economic considerations because they were 
government controlled.140 It would have been politically unpalatable for the 
Chinese government to conduct their IPOs in the United States.141 As a 
result, the Chinese companies with the largest IPOs in 2005 and 2006 used 
one of the Chinese markets.142 These factors that draw market share of 
global IPOs away from the United States suggest that there are other factors 
at work out of U.S. regulators’ and legislators’ control. 
These listings are not necessarily beneficial for the companies involved. 
In 2007 in China, forty-one companies have listed their shares on both the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai stock markets.143 These shares trade at vastly 
different prices due to the Chinese restrictions on stock ownership. For 
example, China CITIC Bank had an IPO in April 2007. After the first day 
of trading, its shares were worth eleven Yuan (approximately HK$10.68) 
on the Shanghai stock exchange and were worth HK$ 6.68 on the Hong 
Kong stock exchange.144 
In addition, it is important to note that while the Chinese stock markets 
may look like stock markets elsewhere, they do not operate under the 
normal economic rules. China tightly controls its stock markets and places 
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restrictions on the ability of foreigners to invest in companies listed on the 
Shanghai stock exchange, and places limitations on the ability of mainland 
Chinese nationals to invest in companies listed abroad or even on the Hong 
Kong stock exchange.145 Chinese nationals, thus, are forced to choose 
between investing their money in savings accounts that pay less than 
inflation, real estate with questionable property rights, or shares listed on 
the Chinese stock exchanges.146 Investors buying shares in Chinese 
corporations are not receiving the same sort of investment that they would 
receive if they were able to purchase shares in an American corporation. 
Shares in Chinese corporations are not equivalent to shares in U.S. 
corporations because they do not give the buyers real ownership rights, 
such as the ability to determine management of the corporation, which is 
frequently determined by the Chinese central government, or dividend 
rights.147 In addition, investors in China do not enjoy the types of 
protections, particularly regarding disclosure of material corporate 
information, afforded investors in the United States or London.148 Chinese 
corporations and the investment banks that work with them disclose 
information to selected investors but not to the market as a whole.149 Stock 
prices on the Chinese stock exchanges do not, therefore, accurately reflect 
the corporations’ valuation. The shares of major benchmark companies in 
China also are predominately held by the corporation or the government, 
which do not trade them.150 The prices listed on the exchanges are, 
therefore, based on a very small volume of shares traded back and forth.151 
These factors combined with the large amount of funds flooding the 
Chinese stock exchanges from local investors mean that the stock prices on 
these exchanges are extremely out of step with reality. On the Shanghai 
exchange in October 2007 stock prices were sixty-five times earnings while 
on the Shenzhen exchange the stock prices were seventy-five times 
earnings.152 
d. Market Growth Rates 
The McKinsey Report concluded that strong growth outside of the 
United States in capital markets revenue would erode the United States’ 
position.153 The median growth rate for capital markets revenue is about 
20% in the European Union and 17% in Japan compared with 7% in the 
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United States.154 The major indexes in the United Kingdom, Germany and 
Japan were outperforming the major U.S. indexes, such as the Standard and 
Poor’s 500, the Dow Jones Industrials, and the Nasdaq Composite over the 
past three years. 
The weakness of the U.S. dollar has also made investing overseas more 
attractive. The euro is now significantly stronger than the dollar in currency 
markets.155 The euro has become an alternative reserve currency to the U.S. 
dollar for many investors. The euro could replace the U.S. dollar as the 
primary reserve currency within the next twenty years if all members of the 
European Union adopted the euro or if the current depreciation trend of the 
U.S. dollar persists into the future.156 
As a result, the compound annual growth rates for these exchanges are 
distorted. Both the Shanghai and the Shenzhen exchanges are members of 
the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE). These market distortions for 
both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges also affect the 24.9% 
compound annual growth rate for the other member exchanges of the WFE 
for 2002–2007 cited by the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation.157 
The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation cited this growth rate as a 
cause for concern because the average compound annual growth for the 
U.S. public exchanges for 2002–2007 was only 11.4%.158 This comparison, 
however, is something of an apples-and-oranges comparison because the 
other WFE exchanges, particularly the Chinese exchanges, do not operate 
under the same economic rules under which the U.S. public exchanges 
operate. 
It is important to note that the decline of the U.S. dollar relative to other 
currencies, particularly the euro and the British pound, affects the accuracy 
of the growth rate comparisons. The Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation cited as a source of concern as regards U.S. competitiveness the 
fact that the London Stock Exchange had an average compound annual 
growth rate of 18.2% for the period from 2002 to 2007.159 It is not clear, 
however, that the Committee accounted for the distortions that the decline 
of the U.S. dollar has on these growth rates. For example, between 2005 
and 2006, the New York Stock Exchange grew 13.1% and the London 
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Stock Exchange grew 24.1% in U.S. dollars.160 Most of the London Stock 
Exchange’s growth, however, was due to the declining value of the U.S. 
dollar. In British pounds, the London Stock Exchange’s growth was only 
8.8% between 2005 and 2006.161 
In addition, as foreign markets have outperformed the U.S. stock 
markets, U.S. investors have become more willing to invest in securities 
traded in overseas markets than they were before the adoption of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Six years ago eight cents out of every new 
dollar invested was invested overseas.162 Today around seventy-seven cents 
out of every new dollar invested is invested in international markets.163 In 
addition, globalization has made more Americans aware of foreign 
companies and their products. Technology also has made it easier to list and 
trade securities outside of the United States.164 
e. U.S. Companies Listing Outside of the United States 
A new development in the past few years is the willingness of U.S. 
firms to list on an exchange outside of the United States. The primary 
beneficiary of these listings has been AIM, where over forty-four U.S. 
companies have listed. Several factors have affected the decision of these 
firms to list on AIM. First, small start-up companies found the U.S. 
markets, particularly Nasdaq, to be less receptive to venture capitalist-
backed firms following the burst of the dotcom bubble in March 2000.165 
Additionally, critics of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act frequently point to the 
concerns that small companies have regarding the costs of complying with 
the federal securities laws in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.166 Other 
costs, however, also affect these firms’ decisions to list in London. The 
initial fee and the yearly fee for an AIM listing are both less than $7,500 
each, while Nasdaq charges a minimum of $100,000 for the initial listing 
fee and between $25,000 and $75,000 a year to maintain the listing.167 
It is, however, worth noting that listing at a lower cost initially does not 
ultimately result in monetary gain. Therefore, the U.S. markets may well 
still have advantages over the foreign ones that, superficially, seem to be 
challenging their competitiveness. Of the forty-six U.S. technology 
companies that listed on AIM between 2001 and 2006, two-thirds of them 
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lost money for their investors.168 A study conducted by Innovation 
Advisors, a U.S. investment bank, compared technology companies with 
$10 million or more in revenues that listed on AIM with those that listed on 
Nasdaq.169 It found that after two years the companies on AIM had lost 57% 
of their initial value on average while those on Nasdaq had gained 12%.170 
In addition, companies on Nasdaq appear to be more highly valued than 
those on AIM. Nasdaq companies are valued at an EBITDA multiple of 
13.2 compared with an EBITDA multiple of 7.1 for companies listed on 
AIM.171 
One of the authors of the Innovation Advisors’ study concluded that the 
tighter regulatory requirements in the United States is actually better for 
investors, since it may mean that only stronger companies can list here.172 
Critics of the Innovation Advisors’ study, however, point to the fact that 
AIM and Nasdaq serve different markets, and that the companies listing on 
AIM are smaller and earlier in their development than those that list on 
Nasdaq.173 The hypothesis that these exchanges serve different markets may 
also be borne out by the fact that some firms that initially listed on AIM 
have later sought a listing on Nasdaq. For example, Ocean Power 
Technologies, a New Jersey-based company, raised £22.4 million with a 
listing on AIM in 2003.174 It, however, never made a profit and by 2006 
needed to raise an additional $100 million.175 Rather than just doing a 
secondary offering on AIM, Ocean Power Technologies decided to list its 
shares on both Nasdaq and AIM.176 
f. Companies Delisting and Listing 
In addition to U.S. markets seeing a general decline in firms doing 
initial listings on them, some evidence exists that firms that initially listed 
in the U.S. seem to either be considering delisting or actually moving to 
delist their shares. A survey of fifty-four European companies with shares 
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listed on U.S. exchanges in 2006 found that 17% of them would consider 
delisting.177 On June 4, 2007, the new SEC rules permitting deregistration 
by foreign companies with relatively low trading volumes took effect.178 
As a result of the new rules, the NYSE and Nasdaq saw an increase in 
the number of foreign firms delisting in 2007.179 Nasdaq, however, did not 
experience as sharp a rise in delistings as the NYSE experienced. It may be 
due to the difference in the number of foreign firms listed on Nasdaq and 
the NYSE. Nasdaq had only 312 foreign firms listed on it at the end of 2007 
while the NYSE had 424 foreign firms listed on it at the end of 2007. 
Alternatively, it may be that the lower listing costs for listing on Nasdaq 
made foreign firms more willing to maintain their listings on Nasdaq. 
Table 6: Number of Foreign Firms Delisting From NYSE, 
Nasdaq and AMEX180 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
NYSE 24 22 27 26 30 56 
Nasdaq (Regulatory) 34 17 7 9 5 4 
Nasdaq (Voluntary) 40 27 22 34 29 37 
Nasdaq (Total) 74 44 29 43 34 41 
AMEX NA181 8 7 7 NA NA 
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Outside economic factors may also play a role in delisting rates of 
foreign firms. Both the NYSE and Nasdaq previously experienced a sharp 
rise in the number of delistings by foreign firms when the dotcom bubble 
burst. Even with the relaxed deregistration standards permitted by the SEC, 
Nasdaq had more foreign firms voluntarily delist in 2002 than in 2007.182 In 
fact, Nasdaq had more foreign firms forced to delist in 2002 for failing to 
meet its listing standards than those voluntarily delisting. 
Reduced listing and increased delisting of foreign firms in the U.S. may 
also be explained in part by the fact that, in most cases, foreign firms have 
derived few benefits from being listed on a U.S. exchange, because a very 
small percentage of their shares, or American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs),183 are traded in the United States. Intershop Communications AG, 
a German technology company that deregistered in 2004, found that only 
1% of its shares were being held as ADRs.184 Even a large foreign firm like 
Daimler-Benz found that in the mid-1990s less than 5% of its shares were 
held through ADRs traded in the United States.185 The remainder traded on 
Deutsche Boerse.186 
Some commentators have noted that U.S. stock exchanges offer two or 
more tiers of benefits for companies listed on them.187 Large corporations 
with stock that is widely followed by analysts and that has large trading 
volumes reap substantial benefits from being listed.188 Small- and medium-
sized firms with stock that lacks analyst coverage and that has low trading 
volumes reap very few benefits from being listed.189 It may be that many 
small-and medium-sized firms overestimated the benefits of being listed 
during the stock market bubble of the late 1990s. These small- and medium-
sized firms may have been encouraged to list by investment banks seeking 
fees and by venture capitalists seeking a quick exit.190 The U.S. exchanges 
experienced a significant rise in the number of foreign firms electing to list 
in the United States during the 1990s. The increase in delisting might be 
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attributed to these firms’ delayed realization that the expected benefits of 
their U.S. listings had not materialized and were unlikely to do so in the 
future. Thus, all of the blame for the fact that these firms wanted to delist 
should not be placed on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Foreign firms can become listed on a U.S. exchange without 
undertaking an IPO. These firms gain the cross-listing benefits of having 
their shares traded in the United States, even though they may become 
listed through a secondary offering or other type of offering. In order to 
judge the true demand to participate in the U.S. market, one needs to look at 
total listings, not just IPOs. In fact, only about half of the foreign firms 
listed on the NYSE became listed through an IPO.191 Below is a table 
showing how many firms listed on the NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX without 
undertaking an IPO. 
Table 7: Number of Foreign Firms Listing on the NYSE, 
Nasdaq and AMEX192 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
NYSE 63 43 28 60 51 33 16 20 19 28 
Nasdaq  75 50 61 119 21 NA 193 3 23 23 21 
AMEX 13 8 7 4 5 8 16 20 34 10 
 
As is evident from this table, the number of foreign firms listing on the 
three national exchanges in the United States fluctuated substantially even 
before the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The NYSE had the same 
number of foreign firms listing on it in 1999, during the dotcom bubble, as 
it did in 2006. Before the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Nasdaq’s 
foreign listings swung wildly from highs in 1997 and 2000 to lows in 1998 
and 2001. In fact, the number of foreign firms listing on Nasdaq in 2006 
was the same number that listed on Nasdaq in 2001. The nadir for foreign 
listings on both the NYSE and Nasdaq was in 2003. Since then, the number 
of foreign firms listing on these exchanges has been relatively constant. The 
American Stock Exchange saw a decline in the number of foreign firms 
listing on it from 1997 to 2001. The number of foreign firms listing on 
AMEX increased noticeably from 2002 to 2005 and then dropped in 2006. 
The percentage of the total firms listed on Nasdaq comprised by foreign 
firms declined very slightly from 10.3% in 2002 to 10.0% in 2007. The 
percentage of the total firms listed on NYSE comprised by foreign firms 
declined noticeably from 20.0% in 2002 to 18.5% in 2007. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the total number of firms listed on the 
NYSE, Nasdaq and AMEX had been declining for several years before the 
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passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The number of listed firms (both 
domestic and foreign) peaked on Nasdaq at the end of 1996 when 5,556 
firms were listed. By the end of 2002, the total number of firms listed on 
Nasdaq had dropped to 3,649, a 34% decline from Nasdaq’s peak in 1996. 
By the end of November 2007, Nasdaq had 3,134 firms listed on it. 
The total number of firms listed on the NYSE peaked at the end of 
1999, when 3,025 firms were listed on the exchange. By the end of 2002, 
the total number of firms listed on NYSE had declined to 2,366. By the end 
of 2006, the total number of firms listed on the NYSE was 2,280. 
The American Stock Exchange saw the number of firms listed on it 
decline from 824 in 1990 to 557 in 2003. Since 2003, AMEX has seen a 
rise in the number of firms listed on it. By the end of 2006, the total number 
of firms listed on AMEX was 592. Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act affects all 
listed companies equally, one wonders what the AMEX has done that 
Nasdaq and the NYSE have not done, which has led to the rise in the 
number for firms listed on AMEX in recent years. 
g. Cross-Listing Premiums 
Several studies have attempted to address whether one can detect 
problems with U.S. competitiveness by analyzing the premium received by 
foreign companies cross listed on both a U.S. and a foreign exchange.194 
One study by Kate Litvak found that the premium enjoyed by such 
companies that were already high-disclosing or from high-disclosing 
countries declined significantly in the wake of the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.195 The size of the premium may be declining because 
the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act make a U.S. listing more 
expensive, or because other nations are strengthening their own securities 
regulation, or both. The Litvak study was not able to determine which of 
these factors was responsible for the decline.196 However, this decrease in 
premium could discourage similar companies from wanting to cross-list in 
the United States in the future.197 The reduction in the cross-listing premium 
provides evidence of a decline in U.S. competitiveness because 
traditionally, companies from countries with weak institutional structures 
and shareholder protections could reduce their cost of capital by cross-
listing on a U.S. exchange.198 These benefits erode as other nations 
strengthen their regulations or as the United States makes its regulations 
significantly more expensive. 
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Another preliminary study by Peter Hostak, Thomas Lys and George 
Yang looked at the effect the Sarbanes-Oxley Act had on cross-listings and 
the decision to delist.199 The study sought to determine if the delistings were 
occurring because the extra compliance costs associated with the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act had negatively altered the cost-benefit trade-off associated with a 
U.S. listing (the Compliance Cost Hypothesis) or because the stricter 
governance standards under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reduced the ability of 
the firms’ managers or controlling shareholders to extract private benefits 
from other shareholders and increase their litigation risks for engaging in 
such behavior (the Agency Problem Hypothesis).200 This study concluded 
that on average the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was driving away firms that had 
poor corporate governance standards and that either did not want to 
improve them or found it too costly to do so.201 If this conclusion is correct, 
then the loss of this share of the market may be a necessary price to pay in 
order to achieve other regulatory goals, such as investor protection. 
Traditionally, the strong corporate governance regime employed by the 
United States has enabled it to attract foreigners to list on its securities 
markets who want to attract investors to whom they would otherwise be 
unable to appeal because of the weak regulatory regimes in their home 
countries.202 In recent years, a debate has raged over whether the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the regulations implemented in its wake have strengthened 
the U.S. corporate governance regime or simply increased the costs for 
publicly traded companies in the United States without improving their 
corporate governance.203 The number of financial report restatements that 
companies filed after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley and the costs of 
switching auditing firms has fueled this discussion.204 
Proponents of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, however, point to recent data 
that indicate that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has improved financial reporting 
and reduced corporate scandals, cases of fraud, and financial-reporting 
issues.205 While the number of restatements increased each year from 2002 
to 2006, peaking at 1,346 restatements filed in 2006, the number of 
restatements filed declined 15% to 1,298 in 2007.206 In addition, the number 
of companies reporting material weaknesses, which often result in 
erroneous financial statements, continued to decline in 2007 to 1,161, down 
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12.1% from its peak of 1,322 in 2005.207 This decline appears to be linked 
to compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Companies required to comply 
with §404 of the Act experienced the largest declines in material 
weaknesses, while the number of material weaknesses reported by microcap 
companies, which are not subject to §404 yet, continued to increase.208 
Section 404 also appears to have reduced the number of adverse internal-
control opinions issued by external audit firms. The number of adverse 
internal-control opinions has declined 43% since some companies had to 
begin complying with §404 on November 15, 2004.209 
Nevertheless, other nations, particularly the United Kingdom, pose 
challenges to the U.S. leadership in the area of corporate governance. A 
survey by Davis Global Advisors ranked the United States second, after the 
United Kingdom.210 The survey found the United Kingdom to be marginally 
better than the United States because of its shareholder-friendly 
environment, which includes requirements that shareholders vote on board 
remuneration, and the fact that a quarter of the companies in the FTSE 100 
do not have the same individual serving as both the Chairman of the Board 
and the Chief Executive Officer.211 Other nations, like Bermuda, Dubai, 
Luxembourg, Singapore and Hong Kong, also are improving their financial 
regulatory regimes and closing the gap between their regulatory standards 
and U.S. standards.212 
In the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s passage, the European Union 
found it easier to adopt measures to strengthen its own regulatory 
environment.213 For example, the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act made 
it easier for the European Union to enact modernization directives that 
national governments and the private sector had previously delayed, 
including legislation addressing EU financial market supervision, 
accounting oversight, and corporate governance standards.214 These 
measures may have enhanced the perception that it is a solid alternative to 
the U.S. market, as well as improved investors’ trust in these markets and 
made investors more willing to invest in companies listed in these markets. 
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2. Banking Markets 
Banking is the most mature financial services market internationally. 
Global growth for banking was only 6% in 2004.215 Nevertheless, the 
growth of foreign banks’ assets in the United States grew by 77% from 
1998 to 2005, significantly faster than the growth of all FDIC-insured 
assets, which only grew at a rate of 67% during the same period.216 
The United States’ banking sector remains relatively fragmented when 
compared with the banking sectors of other developed nations. This 
fragmentation results from the historic barriers that limited both the 
financial sectors and geographic regions in which banks could operate.217 
Those limitations were largely eliminated in the 1990s.218 As a result, the 
United States has experienced a wave of banking mergers in the past decade 
and will likely see additional consolidation within the banking industry in 
the future.219 
U.S. banks traditionally have faced a competitive disadvantage because 
of the stricter capital adequacy requirements imposed by U.S. banking 
regulators when compared with the regulations imposed by the counterparts 
internationally. Basel I and Basel II both were designed to level the playing 
field by establishing minimum international standards for capital 
adequacy.220 Specifically, Basel II, which replaces Basel I in most nations, 
attempts to implement a consistent international risk-based capital standard 
for banking institutions.221 Unfortunately for U.S. banks, U.S. banking 
regulators will only permit the very largest banks to implement the risk-
based model proposed in Basel II.222 Other banks must still use Basel I or a 
hybrid set of regulations referred to as Basel I-A.223 Even the largest banks, 
however, would not always be able to apply the risk-based system. For 
example, a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued by the U.S. banking 
regulators would require even the largest banks to maintain a leverage ratio 
that would force them to hold more capital than required under the risk-
based system of Basel II.224 These requirements would maintain the 
competitive disadvantage of U.S. banks vis-à-vis their international 
counterparts, who will be permitted to operate solely under Basel II. 
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3. Insurance Markets 
The U.S. regulatory structure reduces competition within the United 
States by erecting significant barriers to entry both for new American firms 
and for foreign firms. This structure protects existing U.S. insurance 
companies but harms consumers by limiting both their choices of products 
and providers. The states regulate insurance within the United States.225 
Each state within the United States requires that both insurance providers 
and products be licensed before they can operate or be sold within the state. 
These licensing procedures can be time consuming and costly. It can take 
over two years to get a new product licensed in all fifty states within the 
United States.226 
The United States is not alone in imposing regulations that hinder 
competition.227 Some OECD nations maintain statutory monopolies for 
particular compulsory lines of insurance.228 Other nations severely limit 
cross-border trade in insurance products. For example, Hungary does not 
permit its citizens to sign insurance contracts with foreign nationals.229 
Liberalization of trade in insurance services is tied to the ability of 
nations to establish common minimum standards in order to prevent trade in 
insurance services from undermining the goals of domestic regulation. The 
U.S. structure for insurance regulation, however, has severely hampered the 
United States’ ability to negotiate with other nations on insurance issues. 
The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) conducts international trade 
negotiations on behalf of the United States. The USTR, however, has no 
ability to make binding commitments to change the laws or regulations 
governing insurance that the fifty states have adopted.230 The National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) frequently acts as a proxy 
for the fifty states in international negotiations. The NAIC, however, also 
does not have the power to make binding commitments on behalf of the 
state governments.231 As a result, other nations find it extremely difficult to 
negotiate with the United States on insurance issues. Lack of progress in 
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negotiating more liberal international insurance regulations has hampered 
international competition, which in turn has harmed U.S. companies. 
Some regions have liberalized trade in insurance products. For example, 
the European Union’s passport system, which allows a financial service 
provider licensed in one nation to operate in any other member state, is 
increasing competition within the European Union.232 In light of this new 
passport system, the United States’ regulatory regime does seem to be 
producing a less competitive market for insurance when compared to the 
European Union. Efforts have grown in the past decade to create an 
American equivalent of this passport regime by creating a federal charter 
for insurance.233 Nevertheless, these efforts face stiff opposition from some 
U.S. insurance companies that currently benefit from the protection of the 
current regime and from state regulators. As a result, the proposals to create 
a federal charter for insurance have stalled in Congress. 
B. MARKETS IN WHICH U.S. FIRMS ARE NOT LOSING MARKET 
SHARE 
The financial services firms from the United States continue to lead the 
world in many areas of financial services, including many aspects of the 
securities sector. The United States has more financial stock (equities, 
private debt, government debt and bank deposits) than any other area of the 
world. In 2005, the United States had $51 trillion in financial stock, which 
was 34% more than Europe, 190% more than Japan, and 346% more than 
the total held by Asian-Pacific nations other than Japan.234 
1. Largest Financial Services Firms 
In 2006, four of the top ten of the largest financial services firms by 
revenues were American, up from only three in 2001.235 
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Table 8: World’s Largest Financial Services Firms by 
Revenue236 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
1 General 
Electric (US) 
General 
Electric (US) 
General 
Electric (US) 
General 
Electric (US) 
General 
Electric (US) 
General 
Electric (US) 
2 Citigroup 
(US) 
AXA (France) Allianz 
(Germany) 
AXA (France) ING Group 
(Netherlands) 
ING Group 
(Netherlands) 
3 Allianz 
(Germany) 
Citigroup (US) AXA (France) Allianz 
(Germany) 
AXA (France) Citigroup 
(US) 
4 ING Group 
(Netherland
s) 
ING Group 
(Netherlands) 
ING Group 
(Netherlands) 
Citigroup 
(US) 
Allianz 
(Germany) 
AXA (France) 
5 Deutsche 
Bank 
(Germany) 
American 
International 
Group (US) 
Citigroup 
(US) 
ING Group
(Netherlands) 
Fortis 
(Belgium/ 
Netherlands) 
Credit 
Agricole 
(France) 
6 AXA 
(France) 
AXA (France) American 
International 
Group (US) 
American 
International 
Group (US) 
Credit 
Agricole 
(France) 
Allianz 
(Germany) 
7 Credit Suisse 
(Switzerland
) 
Nippon Life 
Insurance 
(Japan) 
Assicurazion
i Generali 
(Italy) 
Assicurazioni 
Generali (Italy)
American 
International 
Group (US) 
Fortis 
(Belgium/ 
Netherlands) 
8 Nippon Life 
Insurance 
(Japan) 
Assicurazioni 
Generali 
(Italy) 
Berkshire 
Hathaway 
(US) 
Fortis 
(Belgium/ 
Netherlands) 
Assicurazioni 
Generali 
(Italy) 
Bank of 
America 
Corp. (US) 
9 American 
International 
Group (US) 
Fannie May 
(US) 
Nippon Life 
Insurance 
(Japan) 
Berkshire 
Hathaway 
(US) 
HSBC 
Holdings 
(UK) 
HSBC 
Holdings 
(UK) 
10 BNP Paribus 
(France) 
Deutsche Bank 
(UK) 
Aviva (UK) Aviva (UK) Aviva (UK) American 
International 
Group (US) 
 
Most of the top ten financial firms predominately focus on either 
banking or insurance even though they are engaged in a wider array of 
products and services. Only one, General Electric, is classified as a 
diversified financial firm. The top four out of the top five global diversified 
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financial firms were American in 2006.237 These firms included General 
Electric, Freddie Mac, American Express, and Countrywide Financial. 
The number of domestic financial holding companies in the United 
States has fluctuated between 2002 and 2006 as more companies have opted 
to become financial holding companies while others have merged. The 
number of foreign companies choosing to operate as financial holding 
companies in the United States has grown steadily during the period from 
2002 to 2006. 
Table 9: Financial Holding Companies in the United States238 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Domestic 602 612 600 591 599 
Foreign 30 32 36 38 44 
 
The size of U.S. financial institutions and the number of financial 
conglomerates in the United States reflects two trends within the United 
States: (1) the increasing concentration of financial markets as fewer 
companies control ever larger shares within these markets and (2) the wave 
of mergers of financial firms in the past two decades as deregulation 
permitted firms to engage in wider range of activities. The number of 
financial services firms participating in the U.S. financial markets has 
declined steadily since World War I and this trend is likely to continue.239 
While the total number of domestic insurers in the United States has 
fluctuated, as evidenced by Table 10 below, the numbers of life insurance 
companies, property/casualty insurance companies, and health insurance 
companies have declined steadily over the years. The number of domestic 
life insurance companies, which was 1,615 in 1999, dropped 22% to 1,257 
by 2006.240 The number of domestic property/casualty insurance 
companies, which was 3,405 in 1999, also declined by 22% to 2,648 by 
2006.241 The number of domestic health insurance companies, which was 
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943 in 1999, declined by about 15% to 804 by 2006.242 The periodic 
increases in the number of insurance companies are due to increase in 
companies that provide miscellaneous forms of insurance that do not fit 
within the traditional insurance categories. 
Table 10: Number of Domestic Insurers in the United States243 
 
In addition, the asset share of the major financial services sectors 
captured by the top ten companies in those sectors has grown over time, 
except in the case of securities. 
Table 11: Asset Share of Top Ten Companies in the Major 
Financial Services Sectors244 
  1995 2001 
Banks 34 40 
Savings Institutions 21 38 
Securities Firms 60 53 
Life Insurance Firms 34 44 
Property/casualty insurance firms 30 45 
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Over the past two decades regulatory reforms within the United States 
eliminated laws and regulations that had restricted the affiliations among 
banks, insurance companies and securities firms; prohibited the sale of 
certain products or services by banks; and limited the geographic area in 
which banks could operate. These reforms spurred mergers among financial 
firms. The number of mergers spiked in 1998 immediately before the 
passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.245 
Table 12: Value of Announced Mergers of Financial Services 
Firms246 
 
After accounting for the bursting of the dotcom bubble in 2001 and the 
recession in 2002, both the number and value of financial services mergers 
remained relatively constant in recent years. 
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Table 13: Total Number of Announced Financial Services 
Mergers247 
 
Certainly, these mergers have increased the size of U.S. financial 
institutions and allowed them to compete with conglomerates from other 
nations. While this may be good for the competitive position of the United 
States vis-à-vis the rest of the world in financial services, it is not clear that 
these larger institutions are entirely positive for the financial system. 
Specifically, consumers may be disadvantaged by the reduction in choice as 
the number of banks or of insurance companies declines. Larger institutions 
may be less responsive to consumers’ concerns and problems than smaller, 
more local institutions. The immense size of these institutions means that if 
even one of them should fail, it could bankrupt the taxpayer-backed deposit 
insurance fund. Since many of these institutions extend well beyond 
banking, they are putting pressure on the United States government to bail 
them out rather than allow them to go under, even if the cause of their 
failure is due to excessive speculation by the traders of their investment 
banking subsidiaries or underwriting mismanagement by their insurance 
subsidiary. The bailout of the investment bank Bear Stearns by the Federal 
Reserve illustrates the problem of financial conglomerates and firms that 
are “too big to fail.”248 Even though four of the world’s largest financial 
services firms are U.S. firms, providing evidence of the global 
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competitiveness of these firms, U.S. policymakers should temper their 
judgments about the value of this competitiveness against the potential 
costs that these firms pose to U.S. consumers and the U.S. government. 
2. Banking Markets 
After suffering significant declines in market share in the 1970s and 
1980s, the largest U.S. banks reinvented themselves as universal banks and 
recaptured market share in the 1990s and 2000s. U.S. banks have come to 
dominate traditional bank lending. Citigroup, Bank of America and 
JPMorganChase were in the top ten global commercial and savings banks 
by revenues in 2006.249 JPMorganChase, Citigroup and Bank of America 
were responsible for 50% of all global lending and comprised over 70% of 
the global loan book of the world’s ten largest banks in 2004.250 Retail 
banking still tends to be a local or regional phenomenon due primarily to 
government regulations. Nevertheless, some U.S. banking institutions have 
staked out significant global positions in certain product lines, like credit 
cards. Visa and American Express have global presences in part because of 
their willingness to undertake joint ventures with foreign institutions.251 
3. Insurance Markets 
More global insurance companies in most insurance sectors are from 
the United States than from any other nation. Three of the top ten insurance 
companies and five of the top ten property and causality insurers were 
American in 2006. Three of the top-ten reinsurers were American in 
2006.252 In 2006, eight of the top ten insurance brokers by revenues were 
American, up from seven in 2004. Three of the top ten reinsurance firms 
were American in 2006.253 Four of the top ten reinsurance brokers by 
revenue were American in 2006, including the largest reinsurance broker, 
Aon Re.254 The remaining reinsurance brokers in the top ten were all from 
the United Kingdom. 
Only one of the top ten life/health insurance companies, however, was 
American.255 Two of the top ten life/health insurance companies came from 
each of the Netherlands, Japan, and the United Kingdom. 
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4. Securities Markets 
Even in the area of securities, the United States still leads the world in 
many aspects. Foreign markets, particularly in Europe, are more mature and 
offer greater liquidity than they did twenty-five or thirty years ago. Even so, 
these markets still cannot match the size and liquidity of the securities 
markets in the United States. One quarter of the world’s capital is invested 
in the United States but only 6% of it is invested in the United Kingdom.256 
According to the World Federation of Exchanges, the world’s ten largest 
stock markets by total value of share trades in 2006 were:257 
1) New York Stock Exchange (NYSE): $21.79 trillion 
2) Nasdaq Stock Market: $11.81 trillion 
3) London Stock Exchange: $7.57 trillion 
4) Tokyo Stock Exchange: $5.82 trillion 
5) Euronext: $3.85 trillion 
6) Deutsche Boerse: $2.74 trillion 
7) BME Spanish Exchanges: $1.93 trillion 
8) Borsa Italiana: $1.59 trillion 
9) Swiss Exchange: $1.40 trillion 
10) Korea Stock Exchange: $1.34 trillion 
In addition, U.S. investment banks continue to dominate the world. During 
the period from 2001 to 2006, the four largest investment banks were all 
American. 258 These banks operate globally and have significant operations 
in each of the world’s major financial markets.259 
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Table 14: World’s Top Four Investment Banks260 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
1 Morgan 
Stanley 
(U.S.) 
Morgan 
Stanley 
(U.S.) 
Morgan 
Stanley 
(U.S.) 
Morgan 
Stanley 
(U.S.) 
Morgan 
Stanley 
(U.S.) 
Morgan 
Stanley 
(U.S.) 
2 Merrill 
Lynch 
(U.S.) 
Merrill 
Lynch 
(U.S.) 
Merrill 
Lynch 
(U.S.) 
Merrill 
Lynch 
(U.S.) 
Merrill 
Lynch 
(U.S.) 
Merrill 
Lynch 
(U.S.) 
3 Goldman 
Sachs (U.S.) 
Goldman 
Sachs 
(U.S.) 
Goldman 
Sachs 
(U.S.) 
Goldman 
Sachs 
(U.S.) 
Goldman 
Sachs 
(U.S.) 
Goldman 
Sachs 
(U.S.) 
4 Lehman 
Brothers 
Holdings 
(U.S.) 
Lehman 
Brothers 
Holdings 
(U.S.) 
Lehman 
Brothers 
Holdings 
(U.S.) 
Lehman 
Brothers 
Holdings 
(U.S.) 
Lehman 
Brothers 
Holdings 
(U.S.) 
Lehman 
Brothers 
Holdings 
(U.S.) 
 
The United States also dominates the $8.06 trillion securitization 
market, controlling approximately 83% of the global issuance by value and 
87% of revenues in 2005.261 Thus, even if one only looks at the securities 
and investment banking industry the evidence is mixed regarding the extent 
to which the United States has lost its competitive edge. 
5. Assets Under Management 
The stocks floated on U.S. exchanges or sold through private 
placements need buyers. These buyers usually are pension funds, mutual 
funds, or private bankers for high net worth individuals. As a result, many 
investment banks and universal banks in the United States have significant 
asset-management businesses. These businesses are competitive 
internationally. Although the largest asset manager was a UK firm 
(Barclays Global Investors), seven of the top ten asset managers were 
American companies, including the second-, third-, fourth- and fifth-largest 
asset managers by revenue in 2005.262 
Although precise measurements for the amount of foreign money 
managed by U.S. institutions in the United States and by foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. institutions abroad are difficult to come by, anecdotal 
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evidence suggests that foreign holdings of U.S. securities are substantial,263 
and at least some of these holdings are accounted for by the assets under 
management listed by U.S. institutions and their subsidiaries.264 
Table 15: Foreign holdings of U.S. securities, by type of 
security, as of recent survey dates 265 (billions of U.S. 
dollars) 
Type of Security   June 30, 2005  June 30, 2006 
      
Long-term Securities  6,262 7,162 
  Equity 2,144 2,430 
  Long-term debt 4,118 4,733 
    Asset-backed      717       980 
    Other     3,401       3,753 
   
Short-term debt securities  602   615 
      
Total 6,864 7,778 
Of which: Official      1,938        2,301 
6. Private Equity and Venture Capital 
U.S. firms dominate the private equity field. In 2006 seven of the ten 
largest private equity firms by revenue are American, including all five of 
the top five firms.266 Venture capital is a sub-category of private equity. 
U.S. firms also are leaders in that area as well. Venture capitalists made 
significant investments in businesses in twenty-one countries in 2006. In 
2006, they undertook 3,560 deals with a total value of nearly $26.3 
billion.267 In Europe that year, venture capitalists did only 867 venture 
capital deals with a total value of €4.12 billion (about $5.43 billion), or only 
about 20% of the value of American deals in 2006.268 
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In a 2006 survey of venture capitalists from around the world, over half 
of U.S. and non-U.S. venture capitalists were considering expanding their 
operations globally.269 U.S. venture capitalists are primarily interested in 
China and India.270 European venture capitalists were most interested in 
investing in Central and Eastern Europe while Asian-Pacific venture 
capitalists were most interested in investing in the United States and 
China.271 Less than 2% of the U.S. and non-U.S. venture capitalists 
considered the U.S. regulatory environment a major impediment to making 
further investments in the United States. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While the United States has not yet lost its competitive edge in many 
areas of financial services, this does not mean that U.S. regulators should be 
complacent that the U.S. regulatory structure will not harm the 
competitiveness of the U.S. financial industry in the future. The unwieldy 
nature of the over 115 different financial regulators in the United States 
raises significant concerns about their ability to address risks to the 
financial system proactively in the future. Other nations have found that, by 
employing a single regulator or a consolidated regulatory structure, they can 
create regulatory environments that are comparable to or better than the 
United States’ at a lower cost and with a greater level of predictability in 
terms of enforcement and litigation risks for businesses. While the United 
States may not be facing an immediate crisis regarding the competitiveness 
of its financial services industry, this does not mean that there are not other 
compelling reasons for the United States to begin to consolidate its financial 
regulators. 
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